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Characterizing switching and congruency effects in the
Implicit Association Test as reactive and proactive
cognitive control
Joseph Hilgard,1 Bruce D. Bartholow,1 Cheryl L. Dickter,2 and Hart Blanton3
1Department of Psychological Sciences, University of Missouri, Columbia, MO 65211-2500, 2Department of Psychology, College of William and
Mary, Williamsburg, VA 23187-8795, and 3Department of Psychology, University of Connecticut, Storrs, CT 06269-1020, USA
Recent research has identified an important role for task switching, a cognitive control process often associated with executive functioning, in the
Implicit Association Test (IAT). However, switching does not fully account for IAT effects, particularly when performance is scored using more recent
d-score formulations. The current study sought to characterize multiple control processes involved in IAT performance through the use of event-related
brain potentials (ERPs). Participants performed a race-evaluative IAT while ERPs were recorded. Behaviorally, participants experienced superadditive
reaction time costs of incongruency and task switching, consistent with previous studies. The ERP showed a marked medial frontal negativity (MFN)
250–450ms post-stimulus at midline fronto-central locations that were more negative for incongruent than congruent trials but more positive for switch
than for no-switch trials, suggesting separable control processes are engaged by these two factors. Greater behavioral IAT bias was associated with both
greater switch-related and congruency-related ERP activity. Findings are discussed in terms of the Dual Mechanisms of Control model of reactive and
proactive cognitive control.
Keywords: implicit attitudes; cognitive control; event-related potentials; racial bias
The idea of implicit measures is quite attractive (see De Houwer et al.,
2009). Because research participants may not always want to or be
capable of reporting their true attitudes about socially sensitive
issues, measures that could reveal the types and strengths of evaluative
associations without reliance on self-report promise to significantly
advance the scientific study of attitudes. A primary concern with
most measures based on self-report, and even measures based on ob-
servable behavior, is that participants can exert control over their re-
sponses in a way that obscures underlying evaluations. Thus, the ideal
for an implicit measure is that it be structured so as to avoid the
influence of control-related processes, whereby responses are based
purely on automatically activated evaluations and associations.
The Implicit Association Test (IAT; Greenwald et al., 1998) was
designed with this goal in mind. The IAT is meant to assess the
basic evaluative associations people hold toward attitude objects with-
out relying on self-disclosure (Greenwald et al., 2009). In the original
race-evaluative IAT, respondents are asked to sort names according to
the racial group they imply (e.g. ‘Tyrell’ is more common among Black
men than White men) and words according to their positive/negative
valence using only two response keys. Congruent trials are those in
which stereotypically associated race categories and word valences
share a response key (i.e. Black with negative; White with positive);
incongruent trials are those in which race categories are paired with
counter-stereotypic word valences (i.e. Black with positive; White with
negative). Dozens of studies have shown that performance tends to be
better [i.e. faster response time (RT)] for congruent than for incon-
gruent trial blocks (see Greenwald et al., 2009), a finding generally
interpreted as evidence of an implicit bias against Blacks (or a prefer-
ence for Whites). Moreover, individual differences in the size of this
so-called ‘IAT effect’ (incongruent block RT minus congruent block
RT) are often taken to indicate individual differences in the strength of
underlying implicit biases (see Greenwald et al., 2009).
Traditionally, performance on the IAT has been purported to reflect
exclusively automatic processes (see De Houwer et al., 2009), with
responses ‘under the control of automatically activated evaluations’
(Greenwald et al., 1998: 1464). In recent years this view has been
challenged on both theoretical and empirical grounds (see Amodio
and Mendoza, 2010; Sherman et al., 2010; Teige-Mocigemba et al.,
2010). For example, using multinomial modeling techniques that at-
tempt to estimate the extent to which various automatic and controlled
processes contribute to behavioral responses, Sherman and colleagues
(see Conrey et al., 2005; Sherman et al., 2008) have shown that control-
related processes contribute significantly to IAT performance.
In particular, Klauer and colleagues (e.g. Mierke and Klauer, 2001;
Klauer and Mierke, 2005; Klauer et al., 2010) have demonstrated that a
specific cognitive control abilitytask switchingis critical for IAT
performance. Task switching is required in any behavioral task in
which respondents must use response rules that vary from one trial
to the next according to some stimulus feature. For example, on each
trial of the number–letter task (Rogers and Monsell, 1995), a num-
ber–letter pair (e.g. 7G) is presented above or below a central line.
Respondents must classify the number as odd or even when the pair
appears above the line, but they must classify the letter as consonant or
vowel when the pair appears below the line. Task switching is required
in the IAT because respondents must switch between semantically
categorizing attitude objects on some trials (e.g. classifying names as
Black or White) and evaluatively categorizing words (as good or bad)
on other trials. When such switching effects are modeled, studies often
find that performance on a typical race-evaluative IAT is predicted by
an interaction of congruency and task switching, such that the poorest
performance (i.e. slowest RTs) occurs on switch trials in the incon-
gruent block (e.g. Mierke and Klauer, 2001, 2003).
From the perspective of attempting to understand control-related
factors that contribute to IAT effects, such findings illustrate two crit-
ical issues. First, task switching alone does not account for the IAT
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effect; if it did, one would expect the typical main effect of congruency
to be supplanted by a main effect of switching, and the two factors
would not interact. Second, although switches occur in both the con-
gruent and incongruent blocks, switching effects appear to operate
differently in the two blocks. Together, these issues suggest that add-
itional control-related processes not directly involved in switching but
important for the congruency effect also contribute to IAT effects.
Consistent with this idea, analysis of performance generally shows
that responses are slower in the incongruent relative to the congruent
block even on non-switching trials (see Klauer and Mierke, 2005).
To the extent that multiple control processes are involved in the
IAT, Braver’s (2012) Dual Mechanisms of Control model (DMC)
could provide a useful conceptual framework for understanding
these processes. The central thesis of the DMC framework is that cog-
nitive control operates via two distinct operating modes. The first,
‘proactive control’, is the sustained maintenance of goal information
in working memory that serves to bias information processing in a
goal-congruent manner. The second, ‘reactive control’, is considered a
late correction mechanism for dealing with cognitive and behavioral
conflict as it arises (De Pisapia and Braver, 2006; Braver, 2012). An
important assumption of the DMC model is that people determine a
control strategy weighting proactive and reactive modes of control
according to situational factors, particularly factors indicating the
degree to which conflict or interference can be anticipated.
Specifically, proactive control will be heightened when a high de-
gree of conflict is expected, to maintain task goals in the face of chal-
lenging stimulus–response mappings. In contrast, unpredictable
conflict should be associated with less proactive control (to conserve
resources) but greater reactive control, so as to permit momentary
adjustments in the face of conflict when it occurs. A number of studies
involving both behavioral and neural measures have provided support
for these basic assumptions (see Speer et al., 2003; Burgess and Braver,
2010; West and Bailey, 2012).
Given the structure of the IAT, in which congruent and incongruent
trials are presented in separate blocks, both of which involve switching
between tasks, congruency and switching effects in the IAT would seem
to map onto this proactive–reactive distinction, respectively. Relative
to the congruent block, performance during the incongruent block
requires heightened vigilance and sustained goal maintenance (i.e. pro-
active control), similar to what other researchers have observed when
manipulating the proportion of congruent to incongruent trials in a
Stroop task (e.g. Bailey et al., 2010) or high and low interference in a
working memory task (Burgess and Braver, 2010). In contrast, task
switches occur in both IAT blocks, and thus, any conflict associated
with a task switch likely relies on reactive control processes. Thus, it
could be that task switching largely relates to reactive control within
the IAT, whereas the congruency effect relates primarily to proactive
control.
Event-related brain potentials (ERPs) provide an excellent means for
testing the extent to which switching and congruency effects in the IAT
are associated with distinguishable control processes as outlined in the
DMC. Recent research using paradigms involving congruency manipu-
lations similar to the IAT has linked the amplitude of a medial frontal
negativity (MFN) in the ERP to neural processes supporting proactive
control (see Bailey et al., 2010; West and Bailey, 2012; West et al.,
2012). For example, West and Bailey (2012) found that MFN ampli-
tude was greater on incongruent than congruent trials in a mostly
incongruent trial block but not in a mostly congruent trial block of
the counting Stroop task. The MFN is similar in scalp distribution and
time course to the N2 or N200, which is also sensitive to conflict (see
Kopp et al., 1996) but which generally shows an opposing pattern in
response to context, being larger for incongruent trials when
most trials within a block are congruent (i.e. when conflict is a
low-probability event and causes greater preparation of an inappropri-
ate response; see Kopp et al., 1996; Nieuwenhuis et al., 2003). Both the
MFN and N2 have been linked to activity in the anterior cingulate
cortex and neighboring regions (see van Veen and Carter, 2002; West
and Bailey, 2012), structures consistently implicated in cognitive con-
trol (see Botvinick et al., 2001; Yeung et al., 2004; Braver, 2012;
Shenhav et al., 2013). Thus, it seems likely that the congruency ma-
nipulation of the IAT, requiring proactive control, will influence MFN
amplitude, such that MFN is larger (more negative) for the incongru-
ent than for the congruent block.
Task switching also has been linked with specific neural responses as
measured via ERP. In particular, researchers consistently report that
switch trials elicit a positive voltage deflection over fronto-central scalp
locations, often termed ‘D-pos’, which appears to reflect processes
involved in retrieval of the appropriate task set (Karayanidis et al.,
2003; Nicholson et al., 2005; Jamadar et al., 2010). To date, the vast
majority of ERP studies of task switching have involved presentation of
visual cues, signaling whether an upcoming trial will be switch or no-
switch, and D-pos is typically observed following cue onset rather than
target onset. Still, in one experiment, Nicholson et al. (2005) found
that, in the absence of a predictive cue, significant D-pos activity was
observed 200–400ms following presentation of the target stimulus. In
the IAT paradigm, no cue is presented before target onset to signal
whether a task switch will take place. Thus, any switching-related
neural activity can be considered ‘reactive’, representing a just-in-
time shift in response set supporting the execution of the appropriate
response. Given that both the timing (200–400ms post-stimulus) and
scalp location (fronto-central midline) of D-pos overlap with the
MFN, switching-related D-pos activity in the IAT paradigm is likely
to manifest as a positive deflection in the MFN.
Some previous research (Karayanidis et al., 2003; Kieffaber and
Hetrick, 2005; Lavric et al., 2008) indicates that greater D-pos activity
is associated with better switching ability and, thus, reduced switch
costs. However, those studies have all measured D-pos elicited by pre-
paratory cues, and thus have examined activity associated with prep-
aration for, rather than execution of, a switch. In addition to the lack
of preparatory cues, another important difference between typical
switching tasks and the IAT is that individual differences in implicit
attitudes influence the necessity of switching. Klauer et al. (2010)
referred to the phenomenon of ‘task-switch neglect’, which can
occur in the congruent block if implicit associations allow participants
to classify all items according to the attribute task, obviating the need
to switch tasks. Moreover, more biased individuals might experience
larger switch-related neural activity in the incongruent block due to
increased task set interference resulting from stereotype-related re-
sponse mappings.
The current research had two primary goals. First, we sought to
characterize the cognitive control processes engaged during perform-
ance of the race-evaluative IAT by measuring ERP responses associated
with switching and congruency effects, here characterized as represent-
ing reactive and proactive control processes as outlined in the DMC
(Braver, 2012). In accordance with prior research and theory linking
congruency proportion manipulations with proactive control (see
Speer et al., 2003; Burgess and Braver, 2010) and linking proactive
control with MFN amplitude (see Bailey et al., 2010; West and
Bailey, 2012; West et al., 2012), we predicted that incongruent trials
would be associated with increased negativity, relative to congruent
trials, during the interval associated with the MFN (250–450ms
post-stimulus). In addition, and consistent with research linking task
switching with a positive voltage deflection (i.e. D-pos) roughly
200–400ms following stimulus onset (Nicholson et al., 2005), we pre-
dicted that switch trials would be associated with relative positivity,
compared with no-switch trials, during this same interval (i.e. in the
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same deflection representing the MFN). Such findings would suggest
that congruency and switching effects are associated with distinct neu-
rocognitive processes, here hypothesized to reflect proactive and react-
ive cognitive control, respectively (Braver, 2012).
The second primary goal of this research was to examine whether
these distinct neural responses are independently associated with IAT
performance, providing further support for the idea that multiple con-
trol processes are invoked by the IAT. In theory, more biased individ-
uals require more proactive control, relative to their less-biased peers,
to respond correctly during the incongruent block. If so, the magni-
tude of the IAT effect in behavior should be negatively associated with
the congruency effect in the MFN, such that more biased participants
(larger positive IAT effects) experience larger, more negative incongru-
ent-block MFN amplitudes. Additionally, increased bias could make
overcoming task-set interference more difficult, resulting in enhanced
positivity in the ERP associated with task switching as IAT score in-
creases. Thus, participants with increased latent bias should demon-
strate greater psychophysiological recruitment of proactive and
reactive control during task performance.
METHOD
Participants
Twenty-nine undergraduates (24 female and 5 male) between the ages
of 18 and 21 years (M¼ 19.0) at a major public university participated
for partial course credit. All participants had normal or corrected-to-
normal vision, had never suffered a head injury resulting in loss of
consciousness for >3min and were predominantly right-handed.
Experimental task
Participants performed a race-evaluative IAT. On each trial, partici-
pants were presented with one of six stimulus types (positive words,
negative words, stereotypically Black male names, stereotypically Black
female names, stereotypically White male names or stereotypically
White female names) and two category labels.1 They were asked to
categorize each stimulus as quickly as possible using one of two re-
sponse keys. The IAT consisted of a slightly modified standard struc-
ture (Greenwald et al., 2003) including three non-critical blocks with
20 trials each and two critical blocks with 120 trials each (300 total
trials). These blocks were presented in the following order: a 20-trial
practice block of names, a 20-trial practice block of positive and nega-
tive words, a 120-trial critical block of both names and words using a
congruent mapping, a 20-trial practice block of words using a reversed
mapping and a 120-trial critical block of names and words using an
incongruent mapping. During the congruent critical block, partici-
pants saw all four stimulus types and were required to categorize
each as either White or positive (using one key) or Black or negative
(using the other). The incongruent critical block used the reverse cat-
egorization pairings (i.e. White or negative vs Black or positive). Label
side was counterbalanced across participants. Within each block, sti-
muli were presented at random rather than strictly alternating between
names and words. Response labels remained on screen (upper right
and upper left) throughout each block, and targets (names and words)
remained onscreen until a response was made on each trial; responses
were followed by a 500ms intertrial interval.
Electrophysiological recording and scoring
The electroencephalogram (EEG) was recorded from 28 tin electrodes
embedded in a nylon cap (Electro-Cap, International, Eaton, OH,
USA) and placed according to the expanded 10–20 system
(Sharbrough et al., 1991). Vertical and horizontal eye movements
were measured using additional bipolar electrodes placed just above
and below the left eye and 2 cm from the outer canthus of each eye,
respectively. EEG was sampled at 250Hz and filtered online at
0.1–30Hz. Impedance at all electrodes was kept below 10 k. Scalp
electrodes were referenced online to the right mastoid; an average
mastoid reference was derived offline. Eye movement artifacts were
removed from the EEG signal using a regression-based procedure
(Semlitsch et al., 1986). Epochs were created extending to 1000ms
post-stimulus onset with a 200ms pre-stimulus baseline. All epochs
were baseline corrected, after which trials with peaks exceeding 100 mV
were excluded. Remaining epochs were averaged according to stimulus
conditions and electrodes.
Visual inspection of the grand average waveforms indicated a nega-
tive-going deflection 250–450ms post-stimulus prominent at frontal
and frontocentral scalp sites that appeared sensitive to congruency and
task-switching effects, thereby resembling the superposition of MFN
and D-pos. Mean voltage over this epoch was calculated at frontal (F3,
Fz, F4) and frontocentral electrodes (FC3, FCz, FC4) for each
participant.
RESULTS
Analytic approach
Data from the first four participants were excluded because a stimulus
timing error was discovered after their data were collected. Data from
another six participants were excluded owing to excessive EEG artifact,
leaving a final sample size of 19. All retained participants had at least
28 trials in each quantified waveform (median¼ 49 trials per
condition).
Primary analyses of the ERP data were carried out using mixed
hierarchical linear models (HLM). Multivariate approaches such as
HLM have several advantages over univariate repeated-measures ana-
lysis of variance (ANOVA) for analyzing psychophysiological data (see
Gratton, 2007; Vasey and Thayer, 1987), particularly when sample size
is modest (see Luck, 2005). First, unlike univariate approaches, multi-
variate models do not assume the data meet the criterion of sphericity
(that is, that the variances of the differences between any two factor
levels are equal), an assumption that is frequently violated in psycho-
physiological data (Jennings and Wood, 1976). Corrections for violat-
ing this assumption within ANOVA (e.g. Greenhouse-Geisser or
Huynh-Feldt P-value adjustments) result in loss of statistical power.
Second, interindividual variability in both baseline and stimu-
lus-elicited EEG activity often is greater than variability attributable
to variables of interest (see Gratton, 2007), contributing to inflated
error variance estimates in ANOVA that also reduce power. The pre-
sent approach includes an intercept for each electrode within each
subject, reducing these error variance estimates. Finally, multivariate
statistics are robust to missing values, allowing bad electrodes to be
excluded on an individual subject basis rather than excluding subjects
with missing data or interpolating missing values. Here, the data were
modeled as 24 observations (every trial type at six frontal electrodes)
within 19 individuals, including random intercepts of subject and of
electrodes within subjects.2
1 We used race names, rather than pictures of faces, so that racial category cues and evaluative stimuli would all be
words, thereby ensuring that any ERP differences associated with these different stimulus types would not be
confounded by stimulus modality. Information presented on the Project Implicit webpage (https://implicit.harvard.
edu/implicit/demo/background/faqs.html#faq17) indicates that effects from IAT versions using faces, those using
names have produced highly similar effects (for one such comparison, see Nosek et al., 2002).
2 Note that denominator degrees of freedom for F-tests derived from HLM often differ substantially from those used
in repeated-measures ANOVA. This is because degrees of freedom in HLM are derived from the products of numbers
of participants and numbers of explanatory variables (in this case, 19 cases 6 electrodes 2 Congruency 2
Switching).
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Behavior
Reaction times
Log-transformed RTs from correct-response trials were submitted to a
2 (Congruency: congruent blocks, incongruent blocks) 2 (Task
Switching: task switch, task no-switch) mixed model with a random
intercept of subject. This model showed main effects of Congruency
[F(1, 54)¼ 132.92, P< 0.001] and Switching [F(1, 54)¼ 40.44,
P< 0.001], and a Congruency Switching interaction, F(1,
54)¼ 20.38, P<0.001. All pairwise contrasts between cells were signifi-
cant at P< 0.05. RTs were slower for trials in the incongruent block
(M¼ 906ms; s.d.¼ 129ms) than in the congruent block (M¼ 670ms;
s.d.¼ 233ms) and slower for switch trials (M¼ 853ms; s.d.¼ 254ms)
than for no-switch trials (M¼ 723ms; s.d.¼ 254ms). These effects
were superadditive, with incongruent switch trials (M¼ 1018ms;
s.d.¼ 242ms) eliciting considerably slower responses than all other
trials (Ms¼ 651, 689 and 795ms; s.ds¼ 130, 129 and 163ms for con-
gruent no-switch, congruent switch and incongruent no-switch trials,
respectively).
To address a potential concern that the inclusion of female names
might alter the IAT effect, we tested whether log-RT was predicted by
the three-way GenderRaceCongruency interaction. No parameter
involving Gender was significant in this model. The largest of these
parameters was a GenderCongruency interaction, F(1, 278)¼ 3.47,
P¼ 0.064, suggesting that the congruency effect was slightly larger for
male names (M¼ 166ms) than for female names (M¼ 120ms).
Despite the slight difference in the size of the effect for male and
female names, the effect was still robust and significant in both cases
(bs¼ 0.23, 0.17; P< 0.0001 for male and female names, respectively).
IAT scores
IAT scores were calculated according to the conventional IAT scoring
algorithm (C1; Greenwald et al., 1998) and the updated ‘d-score’ scor-
ing algorithm (D2; Greenwald et al., 2003). For each metric, higher
scores are generally interpreted as revealing relatively more negative
implicit evaluations of Blacks relative to Whites. Both IAT measures
were significantly greater than 0, revealing significant bias [C1:
M¼ 0.263, s.d.¼ 0.11, t(18)¼ 10.45, P<0.0001; D2: M¼ 0.773,
s.d.¼ 0.259, t(18)¼ 13.02, P< 0.0001]. C1 and D2 IAT were strongly
correlated, but not as strongly as might be expected for two indices of
the same construct based on the same data (r¼ 0.61, P<0.0001).
ERP data
Figure 1 presents ERP waveforms recorded at frontal and fronto-cen-
tral scalp locations, time-locked to the onset of the stimulus, as a
function of congruency and switching. Amplitude values measured
from the 250–450ms post-stimulus window (the negative-going de-
flection corresponding to the superposition of MFN and D-Pos) were
tested using a 2 (Congruency: congruent block, incongruent block) 2
(Task Switching: switch trials, no-switch trials) mixed model. The
HLM included random intercepts of subject and of electrodes within
subjects. The analysis showed significant main effects of Congruency,
F(1, 339)¼ 18.78, P< 0.0001, and Switching, F(1,339)¼ 45.07,
P< 0.0001. Incongruent-block trials elicited more negative amplitudes
than did congruent-block trials (Ms¼0.57 and 0.07V, respect-
ively). Switch trials, however, elicited more positive amplitudes than
did no-switch trials (Ms¼ 0.25 and 0.74 mV, respectively). The
Congruency Switching interaction was not significant (F< 1).
Associating IAT performance with neural responses
Bivariate correlations among the ERP and behavioral measures of
interest were used to investigate potential associations between
switching and congruency effects in neural response and patterns of
behavioral responses. Correlation coefficients and their P-values are
given in Table 1 and reveal several noteworthy patterns. First, and
consistent with previous reports (e.g. Back et al., 2005), RT switch
cost was marginally associated with C1 IAT scores but not associated
with D2 IAT scores. In addition, congruency and switching effects in
RT were strongly associated, suggesting either that bias plays a role in
determining both or that the control processes they elicit are corre-
lated. Of greater interest for the current report, the congruency effect
in the ERP was reliably associated with IAT scores (both scoring meth-
ods), as would be expected for a neural measure sensitive to the con-
gruency manipulation on which those scores are based. Finally,
although not large enough to be significant in the current sample,
the switching effect in the ERP was associated with RT switch cost
in a predictable manner (i.e. more positive switching-related ERP
amplitude was associated with larger RT switch cost).
To more directly test the hypothesis that more biased participants
(as measured by the IAT) experience greater need of proactive and
reactive control in performing the task, IAT score and all possible
interactions (i.e. IAT scoreCongruency; IAT score Switching;
and the three-way) were added to the previous model in predicting
ERP amplitude. When C1 IAT score and its interactions were added to
the model, a significant CongruencyC1 interaction emerged, F(1,
336)¼ 52.36, P<0.0001, such that higher (more biased) C1 scores
were associated with more negative amplitudes in the incongruent
block relative to the congruent block (Figure 2.A1). Thus, the effect
of Congruency increased with C1 score [b¼7.57, t(336)¼4.15,
P< 0.0001]. As C1 score is a continuous predictor, parameter b repre-
sents the change in slope of C1 between the congruent and incongruent
blocks, rather than a pairwise comparison of means. No other inter-
actions were significant. The SwitchingC1 interaction was not sig-
nificant (Figure 2.A2), nor was the SwitchingCongruencyC1
interaction (Fs < 1). This model provided significantly better fit than
a model without C1 IAT and its associated interactions, V
2 (4)¼ 64.9,
P< 0.0001.
When D2 IAT score and its associated interactions were added to the
model instead, significant interactions of CongruencyD2 [F(1,
336)¼ 45.28, P<0.0001] and SwitchingD2 [F(1, 336)¼ 7.46,
P¼ 0.007] emerged. These interactions were such that the magnitude
of the effects of Congruency and Switching in the ERP each increased
with increasing D2 score. Participants with more biased D2 scores had
more negative incongruent-block amplitudes, compared with their
congruent-block amplitudes [b¼3.35, t(336)¼4.33, P<0.0001]
(Figure 2.B1), and also had more positive switch-trial amplitudes as
compared with their no-switch amplitudes [b¼ 7.46, t(336)¼ 2.36,
P¼ 0.019] (Figure 2.B2). The Congruency SwitchingD2 inter-
action was not significant. Again, as with the model including C1
and its interactions, this model fit significantly better than the model
without D2 and its associated interactions, V
2 (4)¼ 57.3, P<0.0001.
DISCUSSION
Although initially argued to be a relatively pure measure of automatic
associations that circumvents control-related processes (see De
Houwer et al., 2009; Greenwald et al., 1998), performance on the
IAT has been shown in recent years to be significantly related to cog-
nitive control (e.g. Mierke and Klauer, 2003; Conrey et al., 2005;
Klauer and Mierke, 2005; Sherman et al., 2008, 2010; Klauer et al.,
2010; see also Amodio and Mendoza, 2010), as have other implicit
measures of attitudes (see Klauer et al., 1997; Amodio et al., 2004;
Payne, 2005; Ferreira et al., 2006; Klauer and Tiege-Mocigemba,
2007; Bartholow et al., 2009; Ito et al., submitted for publication).
The purpose of the current research was to examine whether
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distinguishable control-related processes as described in the DMC
(Braver, 2012) are invoked during the IAT, and whether these pro-
cesses are associated with IAT performance.
The pattern of findings seen here suggests that IAT performance
elicits two distinct control processes: one influenced by the blocked
congruency manipulation, reflected in the MFN, and one influenced by
trial-to-trial task-switching demands, reflected in D-pos. The ampli-
tude of the negative-going ERP deflection emerging 250–450ms post-
stimulus was independently influenced by congruency and switching
and in predictably opposing directions. As argued previously, from the
perspective of the DMC (Braver, 2012), the predictable blocked struc-
ture of the IAT is perfectly suited to elicit block-level differences in
proactive control, whereas the unpredictable trial-level task switching
in this version of the IAT should elicit the kind of just-in-time conflict
resolution process associated with reactive control. Previous ERP re-
search has linked proactive control with the MFN (Bailey et al., 2010;
West and Bailey, 2012; West et al., 2012), and task switching with
positivity in voltage generally occurring during this same post-stimulus
epoch (i.e. D-pos; see Nicholson et al., 2005). In addition, recent re-
search by Forbes et al. (2012) showed a conceptually similar pattern of
greater negativity in the ERP, in an epoch similar to when the MFN
emerged here, for the incongruent relative to the congruent block in a
gender-stereotype version of the IAT. Williams and Themanson (2010)
reported a similar pattern of increased negativity for incongruent rela-
tive to congruent word trials in a gay-straight IAT. However, the cur-
rent results are the first to highlight that performing the IAT engages
neural circuits involved in both proactive and reactive cognitive con-
trol as outlined in the DMC (Braver, 2012).
Moreover, the current results suggest that engagement of these two
control processes differs according to IAT performance, such that in-
dividual differences in bias might contribute to participants’ experi-
ence of the need to engage control during the task. This idea is
consistent with previous arguments specifically focused on the need
to engage in task switching in the IAT. As noted by Klauer and Mierke
(2005), it is possible to respond accurately in the congruent IAT block
without consistently switching between tasks. For example, responding
to ‘Tyrell’ on the basis of its category membership (Black name) or on
Table 1 Correlations among ERP and behavioral measures of interest
ERP Congr. ERP Switch RT Congr. RT Switch C1 IAT
ERP Congr. 
ERP Switch 0.10 
RT Congr. 0.39 0.12 
RT Switch 0.10 0.34 0.66 
C1 IAT 0.58 0.01 0.82 0.38 
D2 IAT 0.55 0.29 0.34 0.11 0.61
Note: Coefficients in boldface are significant, P < 0.05; coefficients in italics are marginally non-
significant, P 0.10.
ERP Congr.¼ ERP amplitude difference between incongruent and congruent block trials, correspond-
ing the MFN differences; ERP Switch¼ ERP amplitude difference between switch and no-switch
trials, corresponding to D-pos differences; RT Congr.¼ RT difference between incongruent and
congruent block trials; RT Switch¼ RT switch cost (i.e. RT difference between switch and no-switch
trials); C1 IAT¼ conventionally scored IAT score (Greenwald et al., 1998); D2 IAT¼ updated, d-score
approach IAT score (Greenwald et al., 2003).
Fig. 1 ERP waveforms recorded at frontal and fronto-central electrodes as a function of block [Congruent (Congr.) and Incongruent (Incongr.)] and task switching (No-Switch and Switch). Stimulus onset
occurred at 0 ms (also indicated by the vertical line on the waveforms). The shaded area indicates the latency window (250–450 ms) used for measuring mean MFN/D-pos amplitude.
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the basis of it being negatively evaluated (due to racial stereotypes)
would lead to the same response during the congruent block. In
theory, this should be particularly true for more biased individuals,
who are therefore more likely than their less-biased peers to experience
the congruent block as a single-task block in which the response map-
ping component of task switching does not change, even though the
decision rule component (i.e. substituting the race category judgment
for the word valence judgment) should change (see Meiran et al.,
2000). In contrast, accurate responding in the incongruent block re-
quires executing both components of each and every task switch, lead-
ing this block to be experienced as a so-called mixed-task block.
Compared with single tasks, mixed tasks demand more ongoing moni-
toring (i.e. proactive control; Braver et al., 2003), as participants must
determine both which decision rule to implement and which response
channel to use (Koch et al., 2005; Rubin and Meiran, 2005; Yehene and
Meiran, 2007). Because ERPs were predicted by two-way interactions
(i.e. D2Congruency; D2 Switching) but not three-way interactions
(D2Congruency Switching), it may be the case that participants
experience the whole block as a mixed task rather than specifically
experiencing particular conflict on switch trials.
At first blush, these associations may seem inconsistent with the
results of previous studies in which increased amplitude of certain
other control-related ERP components has been associated with
reduced expression of bias in other implicit bias tasks (e.g. Amodio
et al., 2004, 2008; Bartholow et al., 2006, 2012). However, several dif-
ferences between those previous reports and the current work suggest
explanations for these apparently diverging patterns. First, all prior
reports linking control-related ERP responses and performance on
implicit bias tasks have examined accuracy bias. Although the D2 scor-
ing algorithm does include a penalty for errors, the IAT does not
impose a response deadline. Thus, accuracy is largely irrelevant to
task performance. Participants generally make few errors in the IAT,
and bias is reflected instead in RT.
Second, and related to the previous point, the ERP responses exam-
ined in previous reportsthe error-related negativity (ERN; Amodio
et al., 2004, 2008; Bartholow et al., 2012) and negative slow wave
(Bartholow et al., 2006)reflect neural processes subserving arguably
different control-related functions than were investigated here.
Consider the findings of Amodio et al. (2004, 2008), who showed
that making bias-related errors (i.e. making ‘stereotype-congruent’ re-
sponses when the task calls for a stereotype-incongruent response) in
the Weapons Identification Task (WIT; Payne, 2001) elicited a large
ERN, which correlated with greater involvement of control in perform-
ance of the task overall. In essence, this finding indicates that failure to
overcome stereotypic bias generates a neural response that, in theory,
contributes to the individual’s ability to overcome bias, and that this
neural response is larger among participants who are motivated to
suppress bias (Amodio et al., 2008; although they still have some
activated bias; see Devine, 1989) and smaller among participants im-
paired by alcohol (Bartholow et al., 2012). In contrast, bias in the IAT
is determined by the latency required to correctly make ‘stereotype-
incongruent’ responses, and as with numerous other laboratory RT
tasks (e.g. classic Stroop or flanker tasks), trials that require more
control elicit much slower responses than trials that require less con-
trol. Presumably, this occurs because of an association between the
degree to which making cognitively incongruous responses is difficult
Fig. 2 Scatterplots (with regression lines) depicting associations between ERP amplitudes and IAT scores as a function of congruency and switching factors. Panels A1 and A2 depict associations with C1 IAT
scores; panels B1 and B2 depict associations with D2 IAT scores. ERP amplitudes depicted here are residual values after regressing out variance owing to subject and electrodes within subjects. Moving left-to-
right on the graph, IAT score increases, as do the differences between switch and no-switch trials and congruent and incongruent trials.
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and the degree to which relevant neural control circuits must be
engaged to enact those responses. Consistent with this idea, Kopp
et al. (1996) found that the amplitude of the N2 elicited by incompat-
ible flanker trials varied along with the degree to which those trials
elicited activation of incorrect responses in motor cortex, as did RT. In
other words, the amplitude of neural control responses akin to the
MFN increase as a function of the extent to which control is needed
to perform correctly in a high-conflict situation. In the IAT, such
conflict appears determined by individual variability in underlying
evaluative bias.
Finally, it is important to recognize that not all bias tasks tap the
same underlying dimensions of bias, often resulting in relatively low
correlations across measures (see Cunningham et al., 2001; Ito et al.,
submitted for publication). For example, whereas the WIT largely re-
flects bias associated with semantic associations (Blacks are more
strongly linked with guns owing to the contents of anti-Black stereo-
types), the race-evaluative IAT primarily reflects biased affective evalu-
ations. As numerous scholars have pointed out (e.g. Devine, 1989),
virtually all people in a given culture experience automatic activation
of semantic stereotypes on encountering a member of a stereotyped
group, but individuals vary considerably in their evaluative biases. It
follows, then, that to the extent one has less evaluative bias, control
should be less necessary in a task like the IAT. For all of these reasons,
the control functions underlying performance in the IAT and other
bias tasks such as the WIT cannot be assumed to be the same, and
neither should relevant associations between neural control responses
and behavioral expression of bias.
The current results have implications for understanding contribu-
tions of control-related processes to performance of the IAT. Previous
reports (Back et al., 2005; Klauer et al., 2010) have shown that the
influence of task switching on IAT scores is significantly reduced when
IAT performance is scored according to the d-score method (i.e. D2)
outlined by Greenwald et al. (2003). Hence, it might be tempting to
conclude that somehow this newer scoring method eliminates (or con-
siderably reduces) concerns over the role of switching in the IAT.
Of course, changing how task behavioral responses are scored does
nothing to alter the inherent structure of the task and how it is experi-
enced by respondents, and therefore should not change the cognitive
and neural processes it elicits. Moreover, the current findings build on
previous work (Mierke and Klauer, 2001, 2003; Conrey et al., 2005;
Sherman et al., 2008) by situating different facets of control within a
broader, cognitive neuroscience-based framework for understanding
control and the partially separable neural structures supporting those
facets (Braver, 2012), thereby more directly linking knowledge about
IAT performance with what is known about performance on a host of
other laboratory tasks more often used in cognitive neuroscience re-
search (e.g. Stroop and flanker tasks; working memory and inhibition
tasks; switching tasks), as well as a vast literature on the behavioral and
neural manifestations of control (e.g. Botvinick et al., 2001; Miller and
Cohen, 2001; Karayanidis et al., 2003; Koechlin et al., 2003; Nicholson
et al., 2005; O’Reilly, 2006; Braver et al., 2009).
Nevertheless, the advances made in this study must be understood
within the context of a number of limitations. First, the sample size
ultimately used for analyses (n¼ 19) was modest, especially for ana-
lyses aimed at examining individual differences. Thus, caution is
clearly warranted in drawing firm conclusions from the current data.
Although investigations of brain–behavior relationships using func-
tional magnetic resonance imaging routinely use even smaller samples
to draw inferences regarding the meaning of neural responses, it will be
critical for future studies to use larger samples to determine whether
the patterns reported here will replicate. Second, the version of the IAT
used in this study differed in some ways from the way the task is often
administered: participants performed five blocks rather than seven;
stimuli included both male and female names; and the task (semantic
classification vs evaluation) switched randomly between trials, rather
than switching on every trial. Still, the fact that participants performed
many more critical trials in the current study (120 each of congruent
and incongruent) than is typical (40 of each) arguably represents an
advantage in terms of ensuring stable patterns of response.
In conclusion, the current study builds on a number of recent re-
ports highlighting a role for cognitive control in IAT performance (e.g.
Conrey et al., 2005; Klauer and Mierke, 2005; Klauer et al., 2010; Teige-
Mocigemba et al., 2010), but significantly extends prior work by iden-
tifying neurocognitive responses linking the control-related processes
engaged by the IAT to specific facets of control as outlined in the DMC
theory (Braver, 2012), and further characterizing differences in the
control requirements of the task in the congruent and incongruent
blocks. At the same time, the current work highlights the role of under-
lying racial bias in determining the extent to which these control-
related processes are necessitated; after all, for an unbiased participant,
the congruent and incongruent blocks of the task should be function-
ally identical and thus require the same limited engagement of cogni-
tive control for task switching. That the ERP responses in this study
were sensitive to interactions involving manipulated congruency and
switching factors with IAT scores suggests that proactive and reactive
control processes are recruited to the extent that cognitive effort is
required to overcome the biased associations the IAT is intended to
measure (see Sherman et al., 2008). The exercise of control, then, may
be an important cognitive process in IAT performance and a mean-
ingful source of variance in IAT scores, even while variability in the
efficiency of control is a source of contamination (Mierke and Klauer,
2003; Back et al., 2005).
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